

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

23 February 1982

Mr. Brian V. Kinney
Chief, Declassification and
Historical Research Branch
Records Management Division
Washington Headquarters Services
Room 1D517, Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301


Dear Mr. Kinney:

We have reviewed the classification status of the documents forwarded to us under your memorandum dated 5 January 1982. The results of our review are indicated in Enclosure 1.

The CIA memorandum dated 10 May 1950, the DOD memorandum with attachment dated 7 August 1952, and the DOD memorandum without attachments dated 20 September 1954 contain information of possible interest to the Department of State. We recommend that these documents be referred to the Department for additional review.

The documents forwarded under the "List of Attachments" are returned as requested.

Sincerely,



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Chief, Classification Review Division
Office of Information Services
Directorate of Administration

Enclosures:


1. Classification review decisions
2. DOD "List of Attachments"
3. Docs forwarded for review

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee w/atts

1 - Liaison w/DOD w/att "List"

1 - Chrono w/o atts



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Unclassified when
Separated from
Enclosures

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Classification Review Decisions
which Correspond to DOD "List of Attachments"

<u>Attachment/Originator</u>	<u>Classification Decision</u>	<u>E.O. 12065 Authority</u>	<u>Next Review Date</u>
CIA memo dated 10 May 1950	Confidential	1-301(c) 1-301(d)	1992
CIA memo with attachments dated 22 January 1951; Woods Hole Letter dated 16 August 1950; DOD Press Release dated 19 July 1950	Confidential Declassify Declassify	1-301(c)	1992
DOD memo without attachments dated 2 June 1951;	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
DOD letter dated 2 June 1951	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
DOD memo with attachment dated 7 August 1952	Confidential	1-301(c) 1-301(d)	1992
DOD memo dated 2 September 1953	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
DOD memo without attachment dated 16 November 1953	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
DOD memo without attachment dated 25 November 1953	Declassify		
DOD letter dated 4 December 1953	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
CIA letter dated 29 December 1953	Confidential	1-301(c)	1989
CIA letter dated 11 January 1954	Declassify		
DOD memo dated 15 January 1954;	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
CIA Cable dated 11 January 1954	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
DOD memo dated 19 January 1954	Declassify		
DOD memo dated 22 January 1954	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
DOD memo dated 2 March 1954	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
DOD memo dated 22 March 1954	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992

DOD memo dated 30 March 1954	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
DOD memo dated 6 April 1954	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
DOD memo;	Confidential	1-301(c)	1989
DOD memo without attachment dated 11 May 1954;	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
CIA memo without attachments dated 21 April 1954	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
DOD memo dated 25 June 1954	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
OCB memo dated 8 July 1954	Confidential	1-301(d)	1992
DOD cable;	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
DOD memo dated 17 August 1954;	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
CIA memo dated 12 August 1954;	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
DOD memo dated 9 September 1954	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
DOD memo dated 25 August 1954;	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
CIA memo dated 17 August 1954	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
DOD memo without attachments dated 20 September 1954	Confidential	1-301(c) 1-301(d)	1992
DOD memo dated 2 November 1954	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
DOD memo dated 22 November 1954	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
OCB memo dated 23 November 1954	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
DOD memo dated 6 December 1954	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
DOD memo extract dated 25 January 1955	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
DOD memo dated 25 January 1955;	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
Capt. Preston memo dated 20 January 1955	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
CIA cable dated 8 February 1955	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
DOD memo dated 21 February 1955;	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
DOD memo (draft) dated 21 February 1955	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
Attache letter dated 23 February 1955	Secret	1-301(c)	1992
CIA memo dated 11 March 1955	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992

CIA memo dated 29 March 1955	Declassify		
DOD memo dated 31 March 1955	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
DOD memo dated 19 May 1955	Declassify		
CIA memo dated 11 July 1955	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
DOD memo dated December 1955;	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
Notes;	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992
Draft dated 8 August 1955	Confidential	1-301(c)	1992

LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

1. Memo, May 10, 50, Subj: Surplus Aircraft in India (TS)
2. Memo, Jan 22, 51, Subj: Artificial Cloud Nucleation/w 1 Attachment--
Paper, 20 Jan 51, Subj: Consideration of OPC Interest in Artificial
Cloud Nucleation/w 2 Attachments--(1) Paper, Jan 10, 51, Subj: Artificial
Cloud Nucleation ("Cloud Seeding") As A Means Of Increasing Or Decreasing
Rainfall (S); (2) Paper, 20 Jan 51, Subj: Short Appreciation Of The
Tactical And Strategic Aspects Of Successful Artificial Cloud Nucleation (TS)
Letter, Aug 16, 50, Re: Special Study (U)
Paper, Jul 19, 50, Subj: Project Cirrus (U)
3. Memo, Jun 2, 51, Re: Recommendation on General Policy in Dealing with Russia/wo
1 Attachment--Letter, Jun 2, 51, Re: Brief on General Policy Toward Russia/wo
1 Attachment (S)
- 25X1 4. Memo, Aug 7, 52, Re: [REDACTED] /w 1 Attachment--Memo, Aug 7, 52,
25X1 Re: [REDACTED] (TS)
5. [REDACTED] 25X1
6. [REDACTED]
7. Memo, 25 Nov 53, Subj: Letter for Mr. Allen W. Dulles on Observations of
Intelligence Operations in the Field/wo Attachment (TS)
8. Letter, Dec 4, 53, Re: Weaknesses in Over-all Intelligence Effort (TS)
9. Letter, 29 Dec 53, Re: Intelligence (TS)
10. Letter, 11 Jan 54, Re: Deficiencies in Intelligence Collection (TS)
11. Memo, 15 Jan 54, Subj: Clandestine Activities - Korea/w 1 Attachment--
Cable (Sanitized) (TS)
12. Memo, 19 Jan 54, Subj: Discussions with CIA (TS)
13. Memo, 22 Jan 54, Subj: Proposed Agenda for Discussions with General Cabell (TS)
- 25X1 14. [REDACTED]
15. [REDACTED]
16. [REDACTED]
17. Memo, Apr 6, 54, Re: Preparations for Guerrilla Activities (TS)
18. Memo, May 14, 54, Subj: Delineation of Responsibility for Guerrilla
Warfare/w 2 Attachments/wo TABS A and B--(1) Memo, May 11, 54, Subj As Above/wo
Tab C; (2) Memo, Apr 21, 54, Subj As Above/wo Attachments (TS)

19. Memo, 25 Jun 54, Re: Granting of Waiver (TS)

20. Memo for the Record, Jul 8, 54, Subj: Supplement to the Minutes of the OCB Meeting of July 7, 1954 (TS)

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22. Note, 25 Aug 54, Re: Project [redacted], 1 Attachment--Memo, 17 Aug 54, Subj: CIA Interest in Project [redacted] (S)

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27. Memo, 6 Dec 54, Subj: Delineation of Responsibility for Guerrilla Warfare (TS)

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30. Cable Text, 8 Feb 55, Re: Instructions to CIA Stations (S)

31.

32.

33.

34. Memo, Mar 29, 55, Subj: Intelligence Products Exhibit, Central Intelligence Agency (C)

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35.

36. Memo, 19 May 55, Subj: Incidental Intelligence (S)

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38. Memo, Dec 19, 55, Subj: Report on Intelligence Activities by the Clark Task Force of the Hoover Commission (TS)
Paper, Undated, Subj: Notes on the Hoover Commission Report (TS)
Paper, 8 Aug 55, Subj: Recommends (Draft) (TS)

USA Relations

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10/1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN TACUSON, OSD

SUBJECT: Surplus Aircraft in India

1. For our guidance and information at the earliest practicable date, we request the view of the Department of Defense, from the standpoint of its interest in the objectives to be achieved thereby, on the desirability of seeking to avail ourselves of the opportunity described in the succeeding paragraphs. The objectives sought are:

a. To deny to the Chinese Communists or other undesirable purchasers some 90-100 C-47 aircraft reported to be currently offered for sale by the Government of India as surplus to its needs.

b. To enable the U.S., through CIO on a covert basis and in aid of U.S. diplomatic channels, to exert an influence on the disposition to foreign buyers of aircraft owned by the Government of India as well as the servicing and overhaul of foreign owned planes in facilities owned or controlled by the Government of India.

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
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DATE: 2 Feb 77 REVIEWER: _____

TS 41234

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4. For your information, a similar inquiry on this subject is being forwarded to the Department of State.



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FRANK C. WISNER
Assistant Director for
Policy Coordination

TS 41234

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JAN 22 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE OPC CONSULTANTS

SUBJECT: Artificial Cloud Nucleation

1. At the November 8, 1950, meeting of the OPC Consultants it was concluded that this office should solicit the advice of a qualified, impartial consultant in connection with the subject of artificial inducement of rainfall. Dr. Francis W. Reichelderfer, Chief, United States Weather Bureau, was consulted and has provided this office with a paper containing recommendations thereon.
2. Attached hereto is a paper entitled "Consideration of OPC Interest in Artificial Cloud Nucleation", to which is attached two tabs: a. Tab A, "Artificial Cloud Nucleation (Cloud Seeding) as a Means of Increasing or Decreasing Rainfall", prepared by Dr. Reichelderfer, and b. Tab B, "Short Appreciation of the Tactical and Strategic Aspects of Artificial Cloud Nucleation", prepared by OPC.
3. Your attention is also invited to the paper (not attached hereto) prepared by OPC and circulated to the Consultants under date of November 3, 1950, entitled "Significant Considerations and Implications for OPC Concerning Artificially Induced Rainfall as an Operational Measure."
4. It is intended that this subject and further OPC action with respect thereto shall be considered at the Consultants' Meeting of January 24, 1951. It will be appreciated if you can review the attached papers before that time.



FRANK G. WISNER
Assistant Director for
Policy Coordination

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Encls: 2
1. Tab A
2. Tab B

Distribution:

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


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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

June 2, 1951

PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Walter Bedell Smith
Central Intelligence Agency

Attached is the brief containing certain recommendation on a general policy in dealing with Russia and recommendations regarding the eventual military use of anti-Communist Russian manpower. Ilia Tolstoy, together with Boris A. Bakhmeteff and Captain Boris Sergievsky, have put the material together.

Tolstoy tells me that Dr. Bakhmeteff is an engineering scientist of considerable repute and that he is at present a consulting engineer with offices at 250 West 57th Street, New York 19, New York. (Telephone PLaza 7-7030). His residence is at 876 Park Avenue. (Telephone Butterfield 8-1421). Tolstoy suggests that either one, or both, of these gentlemen should be asked to come down and discuss the proposals in person as they have necessarily omitted some aspects of their plan from the written brief.

I understood from conversations with Tolstoy that some of your men have been in touch with Countess Tolstoy, who is, I believe, his Aunt and also with either one or both of his colleagues in this enterprise. Certain of the suggestions in this paper seem to me to have very great appeal and perhaps might be an appropriate subject for the Psychological Strategy Board to pass upon.

With kindest regards.

CIA

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Review of this document by CIA has determined that

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Authority: HR 78-2

☐ It contains nothing of CIA interest

Date 08 FEB 82 Reviewer _____

* w/o att: BRIEF

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

June 2, 1951

Dear Ilia:

Thank you for your letter of May 25th and the brief enclosed therewith dealing with a general policy toward Russia and certain practical recommendations which flow from it.

After reading the brief (which I found most interesting) I talked to General Bedell Smith and also to the Secretaries of the three services. We agreed that several services had an interest in various aspects of the matter and the most effective way to bring the subject up for prompt consideration was to have it studied by the working group assigned to the new Psychological Strategy Board, an Executive Agency recently set up by Presidential Order. While this is going on, consideration of other parts of the brief will be referred to the Secretaries of the three services.

As the matter has been classified by me as secret, I have suggested to General Smith that he ask Mr. Boris A. Bakheteff to come down to see him in the near future. As General Smith and I are both members of the three-man Psychological Strategy Board I hope to take part in this meeting.

With my thanks for the time and trouble you have put on this matter, I am

Very sincerely yours,

S/ RAL

Mr. Ilia Tolstoy



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☐ It contains nothing of CIA interest
Date 08 FEB 82 Reviewer

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

29 December 1953

The Honorable Roger M. Kyes
Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Roger:

I have studied your letter of 4 December 1953 with great interest. I share your conviction that good intelligence is the very foundation of an effective military program, and it is with this realization that the Central Intelligence Agency is making every effort to meet the information needs of the military departments and other agencies of our Government concerned with national security. We welcome your comments and suggestions.

As to the specific points raised in your letter, I have the following comments:

(a) Some lateral dissemination has been made by CIA field agencies to local commanders for many years. It has been a long-standing policy of this Agency to make available to appropriate United States authorities overseas the information results of our covert collection activities which are practicable. Since USCINCEUR seems to have a particular problem in this regard, I would appreciate it if he would raise it in detail with [redacted]

If a satisfactory answer cannot be found in the field, I shall be glad to examine it further with you here.

(b) I am not clear as to what is included in the word "penetration" when you point out that "The military in Germany state that penetration of the Soviet orbit to meridian 50 east should be effected...." It is the prime intelligence problem of this Government to secure information on the Soviet Union. The intelligence community, including CIA, has made this its first target for some time past. At the same time, it must be recognized that this is the most difficult task which has ever confronted an intelligence

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service. Here we must operate against a tightly controlled police state. While the introduction of agents does not present an insuperable obstacle, the maintenance of such agents at important target areas under conditions whereby they can communicate with the outside world has presented the most serious difficulties. So far this effort has involved serious personnel losses without as yet really commensurate intelligence results and available resources of competent and willing personnel for such tasks are decreasing. We have not abandoned these techniques, but we are inclined to feel that they must be supplemented by other techniques better adapted to modern scientific and technological capabilities. This is a matter which I should be glad to discuss with you personally in order to bring about the closest possible coordination between our work and the facilities available to the Department of Defense and the Service Intelligence Agencies in effecting the "penetration" to which you refer.

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
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I should be glad to go into any of these matters with you in further detail. Meanwhile, I welcome your suggestion that our appropriate staff officers should meet as soon as possible to go over these matters of common interest and I have asked my deputy, General Cabell, and Mr. Richard Helms to represent this Agency in a discussion with General Erskine at a time and place mutually agreeable--the sooner the better.

Sincerely yours,



Allen W. Dulles
Director

- 3 -

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

11 January 1954

General G. B. Erskine
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Erskine:

On several occasions we have discussed the undated memorandum on deficiencies in intelligence collection addressed to the Deputy Secretary of Defense by Major General R. C. Partridge, acting for the JIC, which you submitted to me. We have taken account of the requirements noted in this memorandum which conform generally to our own idea as to the nature of our priority targets.

We would be glad, if you so desire, to circulate copies of the memorandum to the members of the IAC, and put it upon the agenda for discussion. However, since this is an internal memorandum from General Partridge to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, we did not wish to take this action unless it had your concurrence. Kindly let me know at your convenience whether you concur in this suggestion.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Allen W. Dulles".

Allen W. Dulles
Director

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Apr 21 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Delineation of Responsibility for Guerrilla Warfare

1. Both the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency have important responsibilities in the field of Guerrilla Warfare, and both have initiated significant programs to implement those responsibilities. It is becoming increasingly apparent that these efforts can be made fully effective only if they are closely coordinated with one another. To this end it is believed necessary that mutual understanding be reached as to areas of responsibility, and that joint effort be initiated where required.

2. There is accordingly transmitted herewith for your consideration a proposed delineation of responsibility for various aspects of Guerrilla Warfare. It consists of a summary (Tab A) and a more detailed study (Tab B), each of which contains a "General Statement" and a "Statement of Specific Responsibilities."

3. Tab A is the portion of the study upon which formal agreement is proposed, whereas Tab B is a more detailed analysis of each aspect of guerrilla warfare.

4. If Tab A (as modified by mutual agreement) is approved, it will provide a framework within which detailed discussions can take place, and joint undertakings initiated, in the realm of guerrilla doctrine, research and development, training programs, logistical programs, etc.

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
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5. Eventually it may be found desirable to extend this delineation of responsibility to cover other aspects of Unconventional Warfare. However, it is not considered practical to attempt to cover this entire field in a single document and it is believed that guerrilla warfare is the activity which requires the most immediate attention.

6. If members of the Department of Defense should wish to discuss any aspect of this paper, I am prepared to designate representatives of this Agency to act, if necessary, as a full-time task group for this purpose. Contact with these CIA representatives may be made through the Office of the Deputy Director for Plans, CIA.


ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

Enclosure:

Delineation of Responsibility in the
Field of Guerrilla Warfare, Tabs A & B

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Operations

25 August 1954

MEMO FOR Mr. Fred Ayer
Special Assistant to the
Secretary of the Air Force (Intelligence)

Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum
 from the Deputy Director of CIA
 concerning Project []

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I am sure that you would be interested
 in seeing it if you have not already,
 and perhaps in retaining it for your
 files.

B. J. Smith

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

17 AUG 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of Defense

ATTENTION : General Graves Erskine
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations)

SUBJECT : CIA Interest in Project [redacted]

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1. For the past year, officers of the Central Intelligence Agency have followed with great interest and attention the various proposals growing out of project [redacted]

If the [redacted] program can be successfully carried out, the results should be most important in the gathering of new intelligence.

2. In addition to the intelligence value of project [redacted] however, there would appear to be certain [redacted] gains of significance that might accrue.

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3. For these reasons, the Central Intelligence Agency has a continuing interest in project [redacted] We believe it to be a promising and potentially most important undertaking. We hope that it will continue to enjoy Department of Defense support. The Central Intelligence Agency will do what it can to be helpful in the progress of project [redacted]

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C. P. Cabell
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Director

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RETURN
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MAR 29, 55

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL GRAVES B. ERSKINE
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Office of Special Operations

SUBJECT: Intelligence Products Exhibit,
Central Intelligence Agency

1. In the interest of contributing to mutual objectives of member agencies of the intelligence community, the Central Intelligence Agency has developed an Intelligence Products Exhibit displaying products of this Agency and of other community members. It is believed that you may consider a tour of the exhibit, consisting of over twenty specific panels, interesting and profitable to personnel of your office.

2. The Intelligence Products Exhibit outlines in graphic form the activities of the various components of CIA. It gives an insight into the processes and results involved in CIA's production of scientific, economic, current and national intelligence and in its overt collection efforts. It presents a detailed picture of the intelligence support facilities which have been set up to serve the intelligence community. There is, in addition, an exhibit of selected intelligence documents published by the other intelligence agencies.

3. A special showing of the Intelligence Products Exhibit is scheduled for 12 April, Tuesday, from 1300 to 1530 hours. We invite your nomination of personnel for attendance, and will appreciate your extending this invitation to personnel at Department of Defense level who in your judgement should be included.

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4. Top Secret clearance is a requisite for all personnel attending the exhibit; there is no limitation on the number of guests. This Office has designated [redacted] as officer responsible for arrangements. It would be appreciated if your Office will advise him at the earliest opportunity of the number and identification of all personnel nominated for attendance at the exhibit, including certification that the nominees possess Top Secret clearance.

STAT

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

19 May 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL ERSKINE

SUBJECT: Incidental Intelligence

1. A group of three persons, two of them psychiatrists, who have been studying the cases of a man and a woman recently released from incarceration by the Chinese Communists, are conducting a seminar at CIA on 1 June. The psychiatrists have made quite an exhaustive study of the motivation and conditioning of these two returnees who are apparently thoroughly indoctrinated with the beauties of Communism a la Chou-En-Lai. I have advised Mr. Kelleher, our expert, who will in turn advise the Manpower and Personnel Committee which is studying this subject. Mr. Kelleher will attend for your office unless you indicate otherwise.

2. It is reported that at the IAC meeting yesterday, General Cabell brought up the subject of the Civil Defense drill in mid-June. He asked where the IAC would meet during the period of the drill. Admiral Leighton quietly remarked that he did not believe the existence of IAC during such wartime conditions is provided for by the current legislation. This was something of a bomb shell, of course, and led to an argument in which the Services pretty much supported Admiral Leighton to the horror of Mr. Amory and General Cabell. It is to be anticipated that there will soon be a move to guarantee the life of IAC during wartime. The details of IAC's functioning during wartime should provide an interesting argument with CIA since the [] will undoubtedly feel that responsibility for IAC in wartime must be military.

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Laylons office com to see me yesterday - The IAC is now meeting to determine its "wartime fate". I said I thought there was a move for something like an IAC but not in its present form nor under its present chairmanship.

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RJS
B. J. Smith

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Authority: HR 70-2
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Date *08 FEB 82* Reviewer []

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

January 5, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, CLASSIFICATION REVIEW DIVISION, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Request for Declassification Review

During the systematic review of all classified Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) documents over 20 years old, the Declassification and Historical Research Branch, Records Management Division, Directorate for Correspondence and Directives, Washington Headquarters Services, turned up the attached document(s).

The documents were either originated by your agency, contain information for which your agency is the classification authority, or are otherwise of interest to you.

It is therefore requested that your agency review the documents and recommend declassification, continued classification at the present or lesser level of classification, and/or review by other agencies. If your agency is recommending continued classification, in accordance with Paragraph 3-401, Executive Order 12065, it is requested that an authority for continued classification be specified, along with a date for the next review.

The time permitted by Executive Order 12065 to reach the point where all OSD documents over 20 years old have been reviewed, and the large volume of over 20 year old OSD documents, make it necessary to request your response within 60 days. In your response, you may wish to provide guidance with regard to what categories of information you do and do not wish to have referred to you in the future.

Your assistance in effecting this review will be most appreciated. Please return the documents to Mr. Brian V. Kinney, Chief, Declassification and Historical Research Branch, Records Management Division, Washington Headquarters Services, Room 1D517, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301, upon completion of your review.

Without attachments, this memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED.

E. E. Lowry Jr.
E. E. Lowry, Jr.

OSD Records Administrator

Attachments (38)

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OSD-DB-TS-003-82